Law Day 2050: Post-Professinalism, Moral Leadership, and the Law-as-Business Paradigm Symposium by Pearce, Russell G.
LAW DAY 2050: POST-PROFESSIONALISM, MORAL
LEADERSHIP, AND THE LAW-AS-BUSINESS
PARADIGM
RUSSELL G. PEARCE*
Inspired by Ted Schneyer's future history of professional disci-
pline' and Bob Gordon's descrption of "the hazy aspirational
world" of the "Law Day Sermon,' I offer a vision of the legal pro-
fession 'a next fifty years in the form of a Law Day speech from the
year 2050. Looking back on developments in the first half of the
twenty-first century, this piece explores the implications of the
analysis proposed in my earlier article, The Professionalism Para-
digm Shift: Why Discarding Professional Ideology Will Improve
the Conduct and Reputation of the Bar.3 The speech presents a
projection of the moral leadership the bar could achieve if it were
to embrace the law as a business paradigm.
As we celebrate Law Day in the year 2050, we can be proud of the
bar's achievements during the past fifty years. Looking back from
this point, it is hard to believe that lawyers were once held in low es-
teem by the public4 and that, as a community, lawyers failed to pro-
* Professor of Law at Fordham University School of Law and Director of the Stein
Center for Ethics and Public Interest Law. I am grateful for the comments of the present-
ers and attendees at the Florida State University College of Law conference: "Defining and
Refining Professionalism: Assessing the Roles and Regulations of Lawyers in the Twenty-
First Century." Special thanks to Ted Schneyer for his generous assistance. I am grateful
as well for helpful comments from Jesse Choper, Hanoch Dagan, Mary Daly, Katherine
Franke, Bob Gordon, Bruce Green, Abner Greene, Geoff Hazard, Tom Morgan, Joey Par-
nes, Carroll Seron, Tom Shaffer, Lloyd Weinreb, Ben Zipursky, Richard Zitrin and re-
search assistant Seunghee Cha.
1. See Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline in 2050: A Look Back, 60 FORDHAM L.
REV. 125 (1991).
2. See Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REv. 1, 13
(1988). Gordon suggests that the "Law Day Sermon" leaves "ordinary life far behind for the
hazy aspirational world... inspirational, boozily solemn, anything but real." Id. at 13.
3. Russell G. Pearce, The Professional Paradigm Shik" Why Discarding Professional
Ideology Will Improve the Conduct and Reputation of the Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1229
(1995).
4. See, for example, The Harris Poll, Jan. 7-12, 1999, ranking law firms last of four-
teen institutions with only fourteen percent of the public expressing "a great deal of confi-
dence" in them. The Polling Report, Inc., ConfidencefTrust in Institutions (visited June 8,
1999), <http://www.pollingreport.com/institut.html>. See also Poll: Doctor is Most Prestig-
ious Job, UPI, June 17, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, UPI File (recognizing that
23% of the public identifies lawyers as having "very great prestige" as opposed to 61% for
doctors, 55% for scientists, 53% for teachers, 46% for clergy, and 41% for police officers);
Stephen Budiansky et al., How Lawyers Abuse the Law, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan.
30, 1995, at 50-51 (showing that 56% of the public believes lawyers "use the system to pro-
tect the powerful and enrich themselves"); Randall Samborn, Anti-Lawyer Attitude Up,
NAT'L L.J., Aug. 9, 1993, at 22 (noting that poll shows the most-cited reason for a negative
view of lawyers was that "lawyers are too interested in money").
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vide moral leadership to society.5 I have decided to take this oppor-
tunity to review the evolution of the bar and the legal system in the
twenty-first century.
Today, as in the twentieth century, the market for legal services
divides roughly into two segments: one for businesses and wealthy
individuals, the other for low- and middle-income persons.6 The ma-
jor providers of legal services to businesses and wealthy individuals
are the "Big 11" global, multidisciplinary, professional services firms
that provide "one-stop shopping" to their clients. In addition to legal
services, these firms provide other services-primarily financial, con-
sulting, and accounting. Some began as accounting firms, others as
banks or investment banks. As they expanded into the delivery of le-
gal services, they acquired law firms or built their own practices.
Among the "Big 11," only Holland & Knight began as a law firm.
While firms exclusively offering legal services have not disappeared
entirely, only a few, such as Cravath & Wachtel, 7 remain.
Today's situation would not have been totally unfamiliar to law-
yers at the turn of the century. By that time, the "Big 5" accounting
firms had become significant legal service providers in Europe and
were beginning to play a major role in the delivery of legal services in
the United States.8 Financial services companies were looking to
5. See supra note 4; see also MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS: HOW
THE CRISIS IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION IS TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SOCIETY (1994);
ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION
(1993); SOL M. LINOWITZ & MARTIN MAYER, THE BETRAYED PROFESSION: LAWYERING AT
THE END OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1994).
6. This formulation is a modification of Heinz and Laumann's division of legal prac-
tice into two hemispheres: representation of large organizations and representation of in-
dividuals. See JOHN P. HEINZ AND EDWARD 0. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL
STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 127 (rev. ed. 1994). Even Heinz and Laumann concede that repre-
sentation of some wealthy individuals might fit within the organizational hemisphere. See
id. at 128; see also John P. Heinz et al., The Changing Character of Lawyer's Work: Chi-
cago in 1975 and 1995, 32 L. & SOC'Y REV. 751, 775 (1998) ('Lawyers employed by large
firms do, of course, handle legal work for individuals-often for the individuals who are of-
ficers of their corporate clients.").
7. This firm resulted from the early twenty-first century merger of Cravath, Swaine
& Moore with Wachtel, Lipton, Rosen & Katz.
8. See, e.g., Philip S. Anderson, We All Must Be Accountable, A-B.A. J., Oct. 1998, at
6 (noting that the "Big 5" accounting firms "began acquiring or developing law firms in
Europe and Australia," that two of them "have announced they intend to become the
world's largest law firms by the turn of the century or shortly thereafter," and that four of
the top five "employers of the most lawyers" are "accounting firms"); Mary C. Daly, Choos-
ing Wise Men Wisely: The Risks and Rewards of Purchasing Legal Services from Lawyers
in a Multidisciplinary Partnership, GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS (forthcoming 2000); John
Gibeaut, Squeeze Play, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1998, at 42, 44 (observing that "all the major ac-
counting firms have significant legal practices throughout Europe [and] ... that the Euro-
pean movement is beginning to wash up on U.S. shores"); David M. Trubek et al., Global
Restructuring and the Law: Studies of the Internationalization of Legal Fields and the
Creation of Transnational Arenas, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 407, 434-35 (1994) (describing
how the accounting firms developed a significant position in the European legal services
market).
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broaden their businesses,9 and many lawyers were adopting an en-
trepreneurial approach to their work. 0
These trends accelerated in the twenty-first century and helped
create the political climate which led first to a de facto and later a de
jure abolition of the prohibitions of legal practice by nonlawyers-the
"unauthorized practice"" restrictions. While some in the organized
bar fiercely resisted these developments, 2 others advocated a com-
promising approach" and a few considered permitting nonlawyers to
offer legal services, as well as to manage and invest in organizations
providing legal services. 14 More and more prominent lawyers joined
professional services firms." The pressure from accounting firms,
banks, and investment banks continued to increase. Big business cli-
ents added their voices in support of these efforts. They wanted the
maximum freedom to choose their own legal services providers. 6 If
9. See Daly, supra note 8.
10. See Pearce, supra note 3, at 1250-53; CARROLL SERON, THE BUSINESS OF
PRACTICING LAW: THE WORK LIVES OF SOLO AND SMALL FIRM ArTORNEYS 17-18 (1996)
(providing examples of solo and small firm lawyers).
11. See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional
and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1, 3-44
(1981) (providing an overview of unauthorized practice restrictions).
12. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Multidisciplinary Practice, Written Remarks of Law-
rence J Fox: You've Got the Soul of the Profession in Your Hands (visited June 16, 1999)
<http://www.abanet.orglcpr/foxl.html> (describing the author's "nightmare" of attending
"the annual meeting of the National Association of Multi-disciplinary Professional Firms");
ABA Comm. on Multidisciplinary Practice, Appendix C Reporter's Notes (visited June 8,
1999) <http//www.abanet.org/cpr/mdappendixc.html> (noting unauthorized practice com-
plaints filed against "Big 5" accounting firms in Texas and Virginia).
13. See ABA Comm. on Multidisciplinary Practice, American Bar Association Com-
mission on Multidisciplinary Practice Report to the House of Delegates: Recommendation
(visited June 8, 1998) <http://www.abanet.orgfcpr/mdprecommendation.html> (recom-
mending that lawyers be able to establish multidisciplinary practices within the frame-
work of the existing ethics rules and prohibitions on non-lawyer practice of law).
14. See, e.g., Edward S. Adams and John H. Matheson, Law Firms on the Big Board?:
A Proposal for Non-Lawyer Investment in Law Firms, 86 CAL. L. REV. 1, 40 (1998) (argu-
ing for repeal of "prohibitions against non-lawyer investment in law firms and association
with nonlawyers"); Thomas R. Andrews, Nonlawyers in the Business ofLaw: Does the One
Who Has the Gold Really Make the Rules?, 40 HASTINGS L. J. 577, 604-05 (1989) (arguing
in favor of multidisciplinary practice and for repeal of unauthorized practice prohibitions);
Pearce, supra note 3, at 1265-76 (arguing in favor of permitting nonlawyers to practice
law); Deborah L. Rhode, Meet Needs With Nonlaywers: It Is Thme To Accept Lay Practitio-
ners-and Regulate Them, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1996, at 104.
15. This trend began in the twentieth century. See, e.g., Tom Herman, Tax Report: A
Special Summary and Forecast of Federal and State Tax Developments, WALL ST. J., Nov.
11, 1998, at Al (observing that "[m]ore high-profile tax lawyers are leaving lucrative law-
firm partnerships to join 'Big 5' accounting firms"); Elizabeth MacDonald, Accounting
Firms Hire Lawyers And Other Attorneys Cry Foul, WALL ST. J., Aug. 22, 1997, at B8
('Accounting firms are hiring lots of legal eagles, making law firms nervous about protect-
ing their turf.").
16. See Attorneys-Multidisciplinary Practice: ACCA Backs Multidisciplinary Con-
cept Allowing Lawyers to Join with Nonlawyers, 67 U.S. L. WKLY. 2499, 2500 (1999). The
American Corpbrate Counsel Association (ACCA), a national bar association for in-house
corporate counsel, stated that it "supports a broad range of choice for clients to select from
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these pressures were not enough, the fate of the unauthorized prac-
tice prohibition was finally sealed when the World Trade Organiza-
tion found the restrictions to be an unjustified restraint on interna-
tional competition.17
Joining the fight against the unauthorized practice rules was an
unlikely ally of big business-the consumer movement. Consumer
advocates were infuriated that low and moderate income consumers
of legal services had continued to face high prices in a restricted
market while de facto abolition of the unauthorized practice prohibi-
tions opened the market serving wealthy individuals and businesses.
The consumer movement's position was consistent with its long op-
position to the legal profession's monopoly on the ground that law-
yers maintained the monopoly for their own interests, not those of
the public,18 and that the disciplinary system was underfinanced, in-
effective, and biased toward protecting lawyers.1 9
As the leaders of the consumer movement correctly anticipated,
the end of the prohibition of non-lawyer practice caused a revolution
in the delivery of services to low- and moderate-income individuals
and small businesses. Comprehensive plans offered by Legal Main-
tenance Organizations, or LMOs, became common parts of employee
benefit packages, 0 as well as viable options for individual consumers
who could afford them.2 ' For those who only wished to make an occa-
sional purchase of common services, such as wills, real estate clos-
ings, and no-fault divorces, H&R Block, American Express and
Merrill Lynch, among others, have developed inexpensive, standard-
ized methods for making reasonable quality services available at a
service providers capable of formulating comprehensive solutions which address not only
the legal aspect of their problems, but various other facets as well." Id.
17. See, e.g., Mara M. Burr, Will the General Agreement on Trade in Services Result
in International Standards for Lawyers and Access to the World Market?, 20 HAMLINE L.
REv. 667 (1997); Mary C. Daly, The Dichotomy Between Standards and Rules. A New Way
of Looking at the Differences in Perception Between US. and Foreign Codes ofLawyer
Conduct, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. (forthcoming 1999) (anticipating World Trade Organi-
zation's consideration of legal services).
18. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Multidisciplinary Practice, Written Remarks of James C
Turner Submitted to the Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice (visited June 16, 1999)
<http://www.abanet.org/cpr/turnerl.html>. James C. Turner, The Executive Director of
HALT, Inc.-An Organization of Americans for Legal Reform, quireied whether the bar's
enforcement of unauthorized practic restrictions was "lawyers defending their economic
turf." Id.
19. See, e.g., HALT, Inc.-An Organization of Americans for Legal Reform, HALT's
Legal Reform Agenda (last modified August 8, 1998) <http://www.halt.org/INFO/reform-
agenda.html> (critiquing lawyer discipline).
20. See Schneyer, supra note 1, at 126 (discussing LMOs); Stephanie Armour, Latest
Workplace Perk: A Lawyer, USA TODAY, Aug. 30, 1999, at Al (noting that "[t]ens of thou-
sands of employees.., are finding a new workplace benefit: access to legal services").
21. Consumers have found, though, that LMOs, like HMOs (Health Maintenance Or-
ganizations), make services more affordable, in part, by limiting the consumer's control of
the delivery of services.
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low cost. New publications aid the consumer by rating legal service
providers. For-profit legal referral services offer more personalized
advice on selecting appropriate services. 2
Some of these developments contributed to a decline in the price
of litigation services. This decline was smaller than that for transac-
tional services, because some restrictions on delivering litigation ser-
vices remain.
The courts established three tiers of practitioners that remain in
effect today. The top tier consists of members of the bar, who can ap-
pear before all courts. Those in the middle tier are "advocates" who
have completed an undergraduate law degree (common in most coun-
tries other than the United States in the twentieth century) 3 or a
special one-year training course and are generally permitted to ap-
pear in trial courts but not in appellate forums. The third tier is for
"aides" who have completed only a two-month long course. Their
practice is restricted to administrative proceedings, uncontested
court proceedings like no-fault divorces, and courts of limited juris-
diction, like Housing Court, where nonlawyers have traditionally
provided assistance to parties.2 4
The addition of the second and third tiers has provided consumers
with more choices and more affordable services than were available
in the twentieth century. Other developments have also made those
litigation services more affordable. Widespread use of videoconfer-
ence court appearances, 5 streamlined discovery practice, and the
greater use of alternative dispute resolution, reduced the time and
expense of litigation. The extension of the contingent fee to criminal
and family law cases made counsel of choice more affordable in those
areas.26 Unfortunately, although prices have been reduced considera-
bly and access has increased greatly since the turn of the century,
22. Most jurisdictions barred the latter in the late twentieth century. See, e.g.,
CHARLES W. WoLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 774 (1986) (describing how rules limit re-
ferral services to non-profit organizations or bar-affiliated groups.
23. See Daly, supra note 8, at 12 (observing that "law is an undergraduate area of
study in almost all the countries of the world").
24. Interestingly, this system of multiple tier legal service providers, including
nonlawyers offering transactional services, resembles the situation in Europe at the turn of
the century more closely than it resembles that in the United States. See, e.g., Daly, supra
note 8 (describing how European legal systems tended to establish a divided profession
"and permit non lawyers to offer legal advice").
25. For an early example of videoconferencing, see Mark Hamblett, Video Bridges
Two Countries in Livent Bankruptcy Hearing, N.Y. L.J., June 7, 1999, at I (describing "the
first videoconference hearing between a bankruptcy judge in the United States and one in
a foreign country").
26. See, e.g., Peter Lushing, The Fall and Rise of the Criminal Contingent Fee, 82 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 498 (1991) (arguing for permitting contingent fees in criminal
representation); Laura W. Morgan, If It Walks Like a Duck and Talks Like a Duck... :
Contingency Fees and Results Bonuses in Divorce Practice, DIVORCE LITIG., July 1998, at
138 (arguing for permitting contingent fees in divorce practice).
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some litigation services remain unaffordable to moderate- and low-
income consumers.
In light of all of these developments, the employment of lawyers
has changed dramatically. While most lawyers work for the "Big 11,"
LMOs, or legal service providers like H&R Block, a few are part of
lawyer-owned boutique practices, usually in litigation. A few small or
solo practices exist for those consumers who would rather shop in
their neighborhoods or obtain the personalized service of a small
business, even at a higher cost.
These changes in practice helped transform legal education to
make available a much wider variety of opportunities. Colleges offer
an undergraduate law degree that permits graduates to practice as
advocates. 27 While some law schools refuse to offer any curriculum
other than for a Juris Doctor degree, others also offer a year-long
course for advocates and a two-month course for aides.2" Students
can choose to attend law school classes in person, through the inter-
net, 2 9 or by some combination of the two.
The regulation of lawyers has also undergone major changes. In
the twenty-first century, a consensus developed that state regulation
of law practice was inappropriate and impractical. State regulators
had never been able to obtain adequate funding or develop effective
enforcement programs. Perhaps more important, they could not pro-
vide the uniformity of rules and enforcement necessary to a market
for legal services that was increasingly national and international in
scope.30 Although firms providing services to businesses and wealthy
27. Such an opportunity was available abroad far earlier. See Daly, supra note 8.
28. For an early critique of a "unitary bar" and unified legal education in the United
States, see ALFRED Z. REED, TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC PROFESSION OF THE LAW 416-20
(1921).
29. For a discussion of some early developments in use of the internet for legal educa-
tion, see William B. Bulkeley, Kaplan Plans a Law School Via the Web, WALL ST. J., Sept.
16, 1998, at B1.
30. See Schneyer, supra note 1, at 127. See Debra Baker, New Push for Going Mobile:
European-style Cross-border Practices May Be the Next Big Wave Here, A.B.A. J., July
1999, at 18 (noting that "a French advocate can represent clients in German courts, yet
New York lawyers can't cross the Hudson River to give advice on the issuance of govern-
ment bonds in New Jersey without risking jail time"). In the late twentieth century, some
support existed for federal regulation of the legal profession. See, e.g., Fred C. Zacharias,
Federalizing Legal Ethics, 73 TEx. L. REV. 335 (1994) (describing arguments in favor of
federal regulation). Others urged the introduction of federal regulation into practice in the
federal courts. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, Whose Rules of Professional Conduct Should Gov-
ern Lawyers in Federal Court and How Should the Rules Be Created, 64 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 460 (1996); Committee on Professional Responsibility, Uniform Ethics Rules in Fed.
eral Court. Jurisdictional Issues in Professional Regulation, 50 REC. ASS'N B. CITY N.Y.
842 (1995). Even advocates of state regulation conceded the tremendous difficulty it posed
for multijurisdictional practice and advocated major reforms. See, e.g., Mary C. Daly, Re-
solving Ethical Conflicts in Multiyurisdictional Practice-Is Model Rule &5 the Answer, An
Answer, orNoAnswerAtAll 36 S. TEX. L. REv. 715, 798 (1995) (acknowledging that the
"movement toward consolidation and multijurisdictional practice" and the "national" na-
ture of the economy had created a "dilemma . .. in multijurisdictional practice"); Charles
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individuals had long provided assistance across state and national
boundaries, the advent of the "Big 11" meant that virtually all pro-
viders in the elite market were global in scope. The development of
LMOs and the delivery of services through retail chains also made
the market for low- and middle-income persons a national one.
Thirty years ago, Congress addressed these changes by establishing
the National Disciplinary Commission for Lawyers and Allied Pro-
fessions (NDCLAP) s' to regulate legal services providers.
NDCLAP's Federal Code of Ethics" [hereinafter Federal Code]
generally resembles the Model Rules of Professional Responsibility
[hereinafter Model Rules] and Model Code of Professional Conduct
[hereinafter Model Code] of the late twentieth century. The Federal
Code diverges significantly from these codes in three areas. First, the
Federal Code is significantly more protective of consumers. For ex-
ample, it requires written retainers explaining the terms and condi-
tions of the representation, including the determination of the cost of
services and the client's option to file a complaint with NDCLAP. 33
The Federal Code similarly requires all legal service providers to
have mandatory malpractice insurance. 4 Second, the Federal Code
requires legal services providers to disclose information necessary to
prevent the commission of criminal, illegal or fraudulent acts "that
the lawyer reasonably believes [will] likely . . .result in death, or
substantial bodily harm, or substantial injury to ... financial inter-
est or property."35 Third, following the trend toward relaxing the con-
W. Wolfram, Sneaking Around in the Legal Profession: Interjurisdictional Unauthorized
Practice by Transactional La wyers, 36 S. TEXAS L. REV. 665, 701, 713 (1995) (arguing that
"lawyers and their interstate clients should be free to approach interstate legal matters
without concern for undesirable and artificial restrictions imposed by state lines," but re-
jecting federalization of lawyer regulation).
31. Schneyer, supra note 1, at 125.
32. See id. at 127 (predicting a "Federal Code of Lawyering").
33. Compare these provisions with ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY, Rule 1.5(b) (recommending, but not requiring, written fee agreements for
clients "not regularly represented") and ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY, EC 2-19 (recommending, but not requiring, written fee agreements). See
Stephen Gillers, Caveat Client: How the Proposed Final Draft of the 'Restatement of the
Law Governing Lawyers" Fails to Protect Unsophisticated Consumers in Fee Agreements
with Lawyers, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 581 (1997) (criticizing prevailing standards for
failing to protect consumers adequately and urging rule changes to provide consumers with
information they need and to penalize harshly those lawyers who violate a consumer's
rights).
34. See, e.g., Manuel R. Ramos, Legal Malpractice: Reforming Lawyers and Law Pro-
lessors, 70 TuL. L. REV. 2583, 2623-24 (1996) (arguing in favor of mandatory malpractice
insurance).
35. N.J. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1) (1998). The language of the
Federal Code, based on the New Jersey rule, departed from the general standard at the
turn of the century which did not require disclosure of client wrongdoing and indeed only
permitted it "to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes
is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm." MODEL RuLES Rule
1.6(b)(1) (1995).
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fficts rules which started in the late twentieth century, the Federal
Code makes all conflicts personal, but requires strict screening pro-
cedures to ensure confidentiality and loyalty within a firm.36
In enforcing the Federal Code, NDCLAP has a wide range of sanc-
tions available. It can fine individuals or organizations or prohibit
them from providing legal services and publishes notices informing
the public of disciplinary proceedings, which are open to the public.
Instead of waiting for consumer complaints, as was generally the
practice under the prior regime of state discipline, NDCLAP pro-
actively conducts random audits. For example, a recent audit of "re-
dacted client billings at the Phoenix office of [one of the "Big 11"
identified] . .. eight instances of 'churning' or presumptive overbill-
ing ' 7 and three instances of inadequate conflict screens.3 The "Big
11" firm agreed to make restitution and pay a modest fine along with
publication of these sanctions.39 As a result of an internal investiga-
tion, the "Big 11" firm disciplined the lawyers and other employees
responsible, decided to modify its minimum billing policy, and re-
vised its screening policy.40 This regime of federal enforcement, to-
gether with increased competition, has resulted in a dramatic in-
crease in the quality of legal services.
While all of these changes increased the quality and affordability
of legal services, they would not have necessarily led lawyers to a po-
sition of moral and political leadership. The catalyst for this devel-
opment was the bar's embrace of the idea that law practice was a
business and rejection of professionalism's dichotomy between a self-
interested business and an altruistic profession. This transition,
however, was not an easy one. The ideology of professionalism had
served lawyers well since its inception in the late nineteenth cen-
tury.4' At that time, lawyers and members of the public complained
that the practice of law had become a business.42 Elite lawyers' asser-
36. See, e.g., Neil W. Hamilton & Kevin R. Coan, Are We a Profession or Merely a
Business" The Erosion of the Conflicts Rules Through the Increased Use ofEthical Walls,
27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 57 (1998) (describing and opposing trend toward undermining im-
puted disqualification of entire firm through increasing acceptance of screens); Wisdom of
Ethics 2000 Panel's Draft on Modifications to Rule 1.10 is Examined, 67 U.S. L. WKLY.
2766, 2767. (Chair of ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professionalism "advocates
screening to cure disqualification, as is provided for under the Restatement ofLaw Govern-
ing Lawyerd'). See id.
37. Schneyer, supra note 1, at 125.
38. Id.
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. See Pearce, supra note 3, at 1238 (describing history and identifying basic ele-
ments of professionalism as "esoteric knowledge, altruism, and autonomy").
42. See Robert W. Gordon, "The Ideal and the Actual in the Law" Fantasies and
Practices of New York City Lawyers, 1870-1910, in THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS: LAWYERS IN
POST-CVIL WAR AMERICA 51, 61 (Gerard W. Gawalt ed., 1984) (describing "the extraordi-
nary outpouring of rhetoric, from all the public pulpits of the ideal bar association and law
[Vol. 27:9
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tion of a republican vision of lawyering grounded in the faith that
lawyers, unlike business people, were above self-interest appeared
contrary to fact.
43
Professionalism emerged to rescue the dichotomy between a busi-
ness and a profession, and to expand lawyers' autonomy through the
enactment of the unauthorized practice laws. Like the republican
perspective, professionalism claimed that lawyers worked primarily
for the common good and not for profit.44 Unlike the republican per-
spective, professionalism conceded that flawed lawyers existed in
significant numbers and that the invisible hand of reputation, while
important, alone was insufficient to police the bar.45 Professional-
ism's contribution was the proposition that self-regulation through
the development of a code of ethics and control of bar membership
through admission requirements and unauthorized practice prohibi-
tions would accomplish this goal and weed out the bad apples. 6
Despite occasional crises, the Professionalism Paradigm persisted
throughout the twentieth century, but eventually the bar and the
public again came to question whether lawyers were inherently more
altruistic than business people. In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,47
the U. S. Supreme Court observed that "the belief that lawyers are
somehow 'above' trade has become an anachronism."" A few years
later, Chief Justice Burger declared the profession in crisis as a re-
sult of creeping commercialism. 9 During the following decades, lead-
ing scholars, judges, and bar leaders joined him in declaring the pro-
fession "lost," "betrayed," or near "death."50 The public echoed these
sentiments. It viewed lawyers as basically out for their own interests
and the interests of the rich and powerful.5
In response, leaders of the profession vainly tried to save the
paradigm. They made speeches and wrote books and articles attack-
ing business behavior by lawyers, exhorting them to return to an
school commencement addresses, memorial speeches on colleagues, articles and books on
the theme of the profession's 'decline from a profession to a business") (citation omitted).
43. See Pearce, supra note 3, at 1241. The Republican perspective was that the mar-
ket for legal services was based on the invisible hand of reputation and not of profit. See
Russell G. Pearce, Rediscovering the Republican Origins of the Legal Ethics Codes, 6 GEo.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 241, 260; see also GEORGE SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL
ETHICS, reprinted in 32 A.B.A. REP. 1, 75 (5th. ed. 1907) ("Sooner or later, the real public,
the business men of the community, who have important lawsuits, and are important cli-
ents, endorse the estimate of a man entertained by his associates of the Bar, unless indeed
there be some glaring defect of popular qualities.").
44. See Pearce, supra note 3, at 1242.
45. See id. at 1238-40, 1242.
46. See id.
47. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
48. Id. at 371.
49. See Warren E. Burger, The State ofJustice, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1984, at 62.
50. See Pearce, supra note 3, at 1257 (quoting commentators).
51. See id. at 1256 (citing polls).
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ethic of professionalism.52 They created Professionalism Commissions
and required professionalism courses. 53 They sought to increase law-
yers' pro bono contributions. 4 None of these efforts had much of an
impact. Most lawyers-like most of the public-rejected the view
that lawyers were above self-interest, and, consequently, they viewed
appeals based on professionalism to be hypocritical, silly, or irrele-
vant to their increasingly business-like work lives.5 5 The public repu-
tation of lawyers continued to decline.56
Nevertheless, the bar could have persisted. If it had, just imagine
what we would have today. I suspect that if the organized bar had
continued to cling to professionalism, its role today would be to serve
as a narrowly self-interested labor organization. One would imagine
that its primary goal would be to gain and protect work rules guar-
anteeing that only lawyers could hold supervisory positions in the le-
gal services departments of professional services firms. The bar's
claims of professionalism would have continued to ring hollow. The
public would have continued to hold the organized bar in low esteem.
Fortunately, this was not the road we took. For us, the turning
point came soon after the demise of the unauthorized practice prohi-
bitions when we acknowledged (albeit somewhat belatedly) that we
had entered into the era of post-professionalism.5 7 More and more
members of the bar conceded that the paradigm of professionalism
was no longer persuasive.5 8 Instead of clinging to the idea that they
were morally superior to nonlawyers, growing numbers of lawyers
embraced the notion that the practice of law was a business.59 What
had been a contradiction under professionalism-that purportedly al-
truistic lawyers sought to make as much money as they could-
52. See id. at 1230 & n.3, 1257, 1263 & n.196 (providing examples).
53. See id. at 1254-56, 1263 & n. 196 (providing examples).
54. See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, A Lawyer's Duty to Serve the Public Good, 65 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1148 (1990) (prominent federal judge urging commitment to pro bono as part of
lawyers' professional obligations); Jerome J. Shestack, The Pro Bono Principle, A.B.A. J.,
Feb. 1998, at 8 (ABA President urging the same).
55. See Pearce, supra note 3, at 1265.
56. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, Predators and Parasites. Lawyer-Bashing and Civil Jus-
tice, 28 GA. L. REV. 633, 663 (1994) (noting a decline in "estimations of lawyers" during
decade); Randall Samborn, Tracking Trends, NAT'L L. J., Aug. 9, 1993, at 20 (describing
poll results indicating decline of respect for lawyers).
57. See HERBERT M. KRITZER, LEGAL ADVOCACY: LAWYERS AND NONLAWYERS AT
WORK 216-23 (1998) (defining post-professionalism).
58. See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 144, 151-52,
159 (1962) (noting that a paradigm shift "begins with one of a few individuals" and then
expands to include larger numbers of community members); see also Pearce, supra note 3,
at 1235-36.
59. See Pearce, supra note 3, at 1265-76 (explaining the business paradigm of law
practice); see also SERON, supra note 10, at x (noting that lawyers "face the same basic is-
sues as do all service occupations"); Paula Dwyer, Soon Anybody May Be Able to Own a
Law Firm, BUS. WK., Jan. 26, 1987, at 42 (quoting Stephen Gillers' observation that in
time "the distribution of legal services will be no different from any other product").
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became a truism.60 Lawyers were like other people. Their self-
interest was very important to them. But so was the public good.
When a significant majority of lawyers discarded the professional-
ism paradigm, the bar faced the challenge of finding a way to moti-
vate lawyers to accept a commitment to the common good. The first
step the bar undertook was an introspective one. It recognized that
professionalism advocates were correct in observing a decline in law-
yers' commitment to the public good. In 1964, Erwin Smigel's re-
nowned study of Wall Street lawyers found that they primarily iden-
tified themselves as guardians of society.6' Just twenty years later,
the situation was entirely different. Studies of lawyers at large firms
revealed that most understood themselves largely as hired guns and
not as guardians of society. 2 This perspective extended throughout
the bar. Contrary to professionalism's commitment to the common
good, the standard conception of lawyers' role had become extreme
partisanship on behalf of clients and moral non-accountability in
pursuit of clients' goals.
6 3
In formulating a plan to restore a commitment to the common
good, the bar sought to understand why this commitment had dimin-
ished. Professionalism advocates had ascribed this shift to lawyers'
increasing business behavior and the bar's increased diversity, which
undermined the ability of a largely heterogeneous, white, Protestant
elite to perpetuate the ethos of noblesse oblige professionalism.64 In
the post-professionalism era, the bar found these arguments unper-
suasive. A new self-awareness of the bar's history revealed that in
previous periods the business-profession dichotomy had survived the
challenges of business behavior 5 and increases in diversity.6
60. See Pearce, supra note 3, at 1267.
61. See ERWIN 0. SMIGEL, THE WALL STREET LAWYER: PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATION
MAW (1964).
62. See, e.g., Robert A. Kagan & Robert Eli Rosen, On the Social Significance of Large
Law Firm Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 399 (1985) (observing that large firm lawyers gener-
ally do not serve as independent counsellors for their clients); Robert L. Nelson, Ideology,
Practice, and Professional Autonomy: Social Values and Client Relationships in the Large
Law Firm, 37 STAN. L. REV. 503 (1985) (presenting findings that large firm lawyers sur-
veyed do not serve as Smigers guardians of the law and instead work primarily to promote
their clients' interests).
63. See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 10 (1988) (identify-
ing extreme partisanship and moral non-accountability as basic principles of lawyer ideol-
ogy); see also Murray L. Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability ofLa wyers, 66
CAL. L. REV. 669, 671 (1978).
64. See, e.g., ANTHONY KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER 273-300 (1993) (describing in-
fluences of changes in law firm conduct and the diversity of lawyers).
65. See Pearce, supra note 3, at 1241-46 (discussing how the professionalism para-
digm preserved the business-profession dichotomy and explained business behavior). The
professionalism paradigm, for example, developed around the same time as, and survived,
the spread throughout the elite bar of the "Cravath System" of lawyers functioning as a
business-like team engaged in "a civil business practice." JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL
JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA (1976). Earlier the republi-
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Instead, the twenty-first century bar found that lawyers' decline
in commitment to the common good mirrored a change in societal
consciousness. The second half of the twentieth century saw a shift
throughout society away from a sense of obligation to the community
and toward the individualistic pursuit of self-interested goals.67 Law-
yers were unable to insulate themselves from this trend. They moved
from a vision of themselves as guardians of society who also repre-
sented clients to the belief that they were hired guns concerned with
promoting their clients' self-interest.68
Further fueling this development was the growth in the late twen-
tieth century of public interest law as a freestanding field of practice
and the related campaigns to increase pro bono efforts.69 While the
earlier Wall Street lawyer, who viewed himself as the guardian of so-
ciety, confronted the tension between the client's interest and the
common good, the growth of public interest and pro bono permitted
his successors to divide their client interests from their public duties.
Elite lawyers could serve as hired guns for their corporate clients,
and yet maintain their good standing in the professionalism world by
expressing their commitment to public service through pro bono work
separate from, and marginal to, the bulk of their practice.70
can paradigm co-existed with business behavior by leading lawyers. For example, lawyer
advertising is a blatant breach of professionalism's taboo on business behavior. See Pearce,
supra note 3, at 1242 (describing professionalism's taboos). Yet, two leading lawyers of the
early nineteenth century, who are still venerated today, participated in an advertisement
which would violate late twentieth century standards by including a testimonial from a sit-
ting judge. David Hoffman, the first American legal ethicist, placed the advertisement in
question in 1835. The testimonial was from Chief Justice John Marshall. See Geoffrey C.
Hazard, Jr. et al., Why Lawyers Should be Allowed to Advertise: A Market Analysis of Le-
gal Service, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1084, 1085 n.2 (1983).
66. See, e.g., Gary Nash, The Philadelphia Bench and Bar, 1800-1861, 7 COMP. STUD.
IN SOC. & HIsT. 203 (observing an increase in the diversity of class backgrounds of bar
members); RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 85-87 (1989) (describing a decrease in
the number of native-born White, Protestant lawyers, and an increase in Catholic and Jew-
ish lawyers, as well as immigrants and children of immigrants in late nineteenth and early
twentieth century urban areas).
67. See, e.g., ROBERT N. BELLAI-I ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART xi-xxviii (rev. ed. 1996)
(discussing shift away from communal obligation); MARY ANN GLENDON, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW 292 (1989) (describing the acceleration of the trend to-
ward individualism since the 1960s--in the context of family law).
68. Compare SMIGEL, supra note 61, with LUBAN, supra note 63, and Schwartz, supra
note 63.
69. See, e.g., Note, The New Pubic Interest Lawyers, 79 YALE L.J. 1069 (1970) (de-
scribing development of the public interest bar).
70. See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON PROFESSIONALISM,"... IN
THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC SERVICE:" A BLUE PRINT FOR THE REKINDLING OF LAWYER
PROFESSIONALISM 47-48 (1986) (emphasizing the importance of pro bono service to profes-
sionalism); John E. Robson, Private Lawyers and Public Interest A.B.A. J., Apr. 1970, at
332, 334 (suggesting that "[i]nvolvement in legal problems of the poor and in environ-
mental issues is replacing participation in a bar association's corporate law section, and
aspiration to lead the local legal aid program ranks with ambition to head the local bar as-
sociation"); Todays News. Update, N.Y. L.J., June 15, 1999, at 1 (describing a ceremony
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With this new understanding of the decline in commitment to the
common good, the twenty-first century bar sought to restore it. In
this effort, the bar had four distinct advantages over professionalism
advocates. The first advantage was removal of the burden of profes-
sionalism. This meant both that the organized bar need not try to sell
an unpersuasive ideology and that it could dispense with jeremiads
against business behavior. Leaving the fight against commercialism
behind, the bar's message was simple: commitment to the common
good.
The second advantage was the pressure of competition from
nonlawyers. As a matter of self-interest, the bar needed to distin-
guish itself. Simply put, promoting the common good through
strenuous individual and organized efforts was good public relations
for members of the bar (which was far more necessary than when
lawyers had no competition from nonlawyers). Similarly, self-policing
was no longer the unfulfilled aspiration of a monopoly. It had become
essential to creating a positive "brand name."
The third advantage was that viewing and maintaining law prac-
tice as a business demanded moral accountability. Under the ideol-
ogy of professionalism, lawyers had the autonomy to create their own
role morality. In the late twentieth century, lawyers filled that role
with extreme partisanship and moral non-accountability.7' The end
of professionalism meant the end of autonomy and therefore moral
non-accountability. Lawyers had no choice but to accept that they
were accountable for their actions just like everyone else. 72 Accep-
tance of moral responsibility did not result in abandonment of loyalty
to clients. But, much as our republican forebears and Smigel's Wall
Street lawyers, the bar viewed this obligation in the context of law-
yers' larger obligation to the common good. Moral accountability be-
came an important concern for individual lawyers and the organized
bar. In addition to holding each other to moral standards, lawyers
were able to engage in constructive dialogue about their work with
members of the public who, unlike lawyers, had for a long time con-
sidered lawyers morally accountable for their actions.
For a fourth advantage, accepting law practice as a business
placed a burden on lawyers to demonstrate their commitment to the
common good. Professionalism had simply assumed that the commu-
nity of lawyers would promote the common good and thereby earn
the public's respect. In contrast, being part of a business placed law-
honoring a large law firm for accepting many pro bono referrals in the preceding twenty
years).
71. See LUBAN, supra note 63.
72. See, e.g., Thomas L. Shaffer, Lawyer Professionalism as a Moral Argument, 26
GONZ. L. REV. 393, 403-04 (1990-91) (arguing that each person has an obligation to the
common good regardless of his or her occupation).
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yers on the same footing as other occupations. If lawyers wanted re-
spect for moral leadership, they would have to earn it.
With all these advantages, the bar found the common good a
much easier sell. Like others in society, lawyers were searching for
meaning in their work beyond making money.73 Discarding the aspi-
ration of moral non-accountability, they engaged the rich potential to
make a positive difference for their clients, for those involved with
their clients, and for society as a whole. After years of dialogue, law-
yers reached a consensus on a moral vision of their role as business
persons with responsibility for the administration of justice. This
shared commitment has enabled the bar to become a model of a
moral, responsible business community.
Lawyers' moral leadership, together with other changes in prac-
tice, transformed lawyers' public image. The public has appreciated
lawyers' commitment to the common good, as well as the many posi-
tive changes in the market and in regulation that have made the de-
livery of legal services and the legal system far more consumer
friendly and affordable. Now that clients have the choice of retaining
lawyers or nonlawyers, they choose lawyers only when they believe
lawyers will provide better quality services at a better price. One re-
sult of this change is that business executives no longer complain
that lawyers add no value towards a transaction.7 4 When clients
choose to hire lawyers, it's precisely because of the significant value
they do add.
Despite the dramatic increase in public confidence in the bar,
some hostility to lawyers continues. Far too many members of the
public continue to reject the fundamental moral principle that every
person is entitled to representation. They believe that in every dis-
pute only one side is right and deserving of a lawyer's assistance.
Discarding professionalism has forced us to articulate our moral vi-
sion with more clarity, but, nonetheless, some remain unconvinced.
We have other challenges before us as well. We still have not fully
resolved the problem of providing services to those too poor to afford
even the lower prices presently available. Despite our lack of success
73. See e.g., Russell G. Pearce, Foreword: The Religious Lawyering Movement: An
Emerging Force in Legal Ethics and Professionalism, 66 FoRDHAM L. REV. 1075, 1081
(1998) (discussing "lawyers' continuing search for meaning in their work").
74. See, e.g., Ronald L. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and
Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 255 (1984) (describing the value lawyers add to transac-
tions and describing lawyers as "transaction cost engineers"); Steven H. Hobbs, Toward a
Theory of Law and Entrepreneurship, 26 CAP. U. L. REV. 241, 282-83 (1997) (same). Cf.
RICHARD SUSSKIND, THE FUTURE OF THE LAW: FACING THE CHALLENGES OF INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY, 288 (1996) (predicting that "[i]nstead of regarding the law as restrictive, us-
ers of legal information services will gradually appreciate that the law can be a source of
empowerment and a powerful weapon which can be marshalled in support of the exploita-
tion of opportunities and the attainment of all manner of objectives").
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thus far, we must not give up on trying to realize more fully the goal
of equal justice under law.
This failing reminds us that we should not be smug or self-
righteous about the tremendous strides we have made since the turn
of the century. Although we have discarded the ideology of profes-
sionalism, we must continue to respect the tradition of our predeces-
sors who employed professionalism to promote the common good.
On this occasion, I would particularly like to honor the memory of
Justice Louis D. Brandeis. Although an exponent of professionalism,
he rejected the distinction between a business and a profession and
asserted that business should join the elite ranks of the learned pro-
fessions. 71 We at the bar today have come to a similar conclusion
based on a different rationale. We have discarded professionalism in
favor of the understanding that all people, whether in the elite or
not, share responsibility for the public good in whatever work they
do.76 The work of the bar involves the administration of justice and
the preservation of order. This places a great responsibility upon us.
On this Law Day 2050, let us rededicate ourselves to promoting jus-
tice through our work and let us keep in mind words Louis Brandeis
wrote almost 150 years ago: "There is a call upon the [bar] to do a
great work for this country.""7
75. See Louis D. Brandeis, Business--A Profession, in BUSINESS-A PROFESSION 1, 1
(Louis D. Brandeis ed. 1932) (asserting that "[t]he time has come for abandoning [the] clas-
sification [of business] or profession dichotomy").
76. Shaffer, supra note 72.
77. Louis D. Brandeis, The Opportunity in the law, in Brandeis, supra note 75, at
243, 329.
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